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1  Introduction 
 
Postponement has been a major keyword in the description and the study of 
demographic trends observed in developed countries during the last decades. With 
few exceptions, during the recent decades demographic events such as those 
leading to the formation of new households and families have occurred later and 
later in the lives of women and men. Although considerable heterogeneity exists 
both between and within countries in this general pattern of postponement, almost 
everywhere in the developed world events such as leaving the parental home, 
forming a new union, getting married and becoming a parent are being 
experienced on average later in life than ever before. Postponement has been 
particularly important in understanding the fertility decline observed across 
Europe over the last few decades. As Table 1 makes clear, such postponement has 
been pervasive, with increases in the mean age at first birth of the order of 
magnitude of three or four years during the 1980-2004 period (with the exception 
of Russia). Correspondingly, also the general mean age at childbearing has 
increased. 
As a consequence of the observation of these stylised facts, understanding the 
causes and consequences of fertility postponement has been high on the 
demographic research agenda. However, many open questions still remain: How 
exactly should postponement be defined and measured? What is its effect on 
fertility levels? How does it interact with other life course events? What are its 
bio-medical and socio-economic dimensions? And, finally, what are the 
consequences, and should governments intervene with adequate policies? These 
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were some of the issues discussed at the International Conference on the 
Postponement of Childbearing in Europe that took place in Vienna, 1-3 December 
2005, organised by the Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy 
of Sciences, Università Bocconi, and the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis in collaboration with the Working Group on the Second 
Demographic Transition in Europe of the European Association for Population 
Studies on the premises of Statistics Austria. The articles in this Special Issue of 
the Vienna Yearbook of Population Research result from a peer-reviewed 
selection of the papers presented at what proved to be a particularly successful 
scientific meeting. This introduction is meant to provide a general overview of the 
issues at stake and to highlight the contributions that the articles in this volume 
make to our understanding of these issues. 
 
Table 1: 
Mean age at first birth, mean age at childbearing and total fertility rate for selected 
countries from different regions in Europe, 1980 and 2004 
  Mean age at first birth  Mean age at childbearing Total fertility rate 
  1980 2004  1980  2004 1980  2004 
Bulgaria   21.9      24.4      23.9      25.7      2.05      1.29     
Czech Republic  22.4      26.3      24.7      28.3      2.10      1.22     
Netherlands  25.7      28.9      27.7      30.5      1.60      1.73     
Russia  23.0      24.0  25.7      25.9      1.86      1.33     
Spain   25.0      29.3   28.2      30.9  2.20      1.32     
Sweden  25.3      28.6      27.6      30.4      1.68      1.75     
 
The structure of this introductory article is as follows. Section 2 deals with the 
causes, i.e., the forces driving the postponement of childbearing. Instead of 
presenting an overview of all relevant factors, we will limit our discussion to a 
few major driving forces, namely ideational change, the rise of women’s human 
capital and the increase in uncertainty coupled with policy changes. Section 3 
deals with the consequences of the postponement of childbearing. Both aggregate-
level (and measurement) and micro-level implications are discussed. The social 
and economic relevance of the potential consequences of postponement has led to 
an increased awareness about these issues among policy makers. Section  4 
discusses the need for, and feasibility of, policy measures to counteract these 
potential consequences. Finally, some concluding remarks on promising future 
avenues for research will be made in Section 5. In each section, the contribution 
of articles included in this issue will be highlighted. The order of subsequent 
articles in the issue therefore reflects our (completely subjective) reading path, as 
outlined in this introduction. 
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2  On the Driving Forces of Postponement 
 
What are the main driving forces behind the postponement of childbearing? 
Clearly, a comprehensive review of the issue is outside the scope of this 
introduction. Numerous factors have been identified in the literature (see, e.g., 
Sobotka 2004a, for a review and references). In what follows, we focus on three 
of the main driving forces only. First, we discuss ideational change and how the 
idea of a “Second Demographic Transition” relates to the postponement of 
childbearing. Second, we point to the crucial importance of increasing female 
human capital accumulation. Third, we comment on the potential role of 
uncertainty, both from an economic point of view and as expressed by anomy, 
and policy changes related to rising economic insecurity that might shape 
postponement especially in central and eastern Europe. 
 
2.1  The Second Demographic Transition and the 
Postponement of Childbearing 
 
The general trend towards postponement is an important element of the concept 
of Second Demographic Transition (SDT). According to the proponents of the 
SDT concept, whose usefulness had been subject to debate in the 2004 edition of 
the Vienna Yearbook, the transition started in northern Europe during the 1960s 
and has since diffused across the industrialised world (Lesthaeghe and Van de 
Kaa 1986; Van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995). The SDT framework suggests 
that demographic changes, including postponement of childbearing, are to a large 
extent due to ideational shifts, in particular to the increased emphasis on 
individual autonomy, the rejection of institutional control, the rise of values 
associated with the satisfaction of individuals’ ‘higher-order needs’, and the 
growth in gender equality (see, e.g., Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). These 
ideational changes have led to the emergence of ‘postmodern fertility preferences’ 
(Van de Kaa 2001).  
These same themes appear in the sociological literature, where the emergence 
of ‘new’ family behaviour (like cohabitation and non-marital childbearing) has 
been considered one of the signs of a process of individualisation of life courses 
as well as an aspect of the evolution of western European and North American 
societies towards a new modernity (Buchmann 1989; Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). 
The SDT and the ‘new modernity’ ideas share a ‘developmental’ perspective on 
societal change: societies are assumed to develop through a sequence of stages 
leading in a certain direction. This concept, intertwined with the notion of 
‘transition’, has had a strong impact on demographic research (Thornton 2001).  
The centrality of fertility postponement with the SDT is evidenced by Van de 
Kaa (1997). Based on observations on the 1965-1995 period, Van de Kaa 
postulates that the SDT is constituted by a complex set of sequences of stages. He 
identifies 15 stages, some of which are explicitly connected to the postponement Introduction 
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of childbearing. In stage  2, premarital pregnancies are avoided. In stage  4, 
childbearing within marriage is postponed, with a decline of fertility among 
young women that accentuates the decline in period TFR (see also the discussion 
in Section  3). Much later on, in stage  12, the period TFR increases slightly 
because births by women who postponed childbearing lead to an increase in 
lower-order birth rates at higher ages. However, not all postponed births can be 
realised (stage  13), and voluntary childlessness becomes significant (stage  14). 
This sequence of stages seems to correspond empirically to current developments 
in Europe. 
Although the idea that fertility postponement is linked to ideational change is 
enticing, most empirical research only offers correlational evidence. For instance, 
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2004) find a correlation between value orientations and 
family choices using data from the European Values Study. However, panel 
studies in which the actual childbearing behaviour is observed after values have 
been measured, offer much stronger evidence that values actually influence 
fertility behaviour. An example is Liefbroer (2005), who documents that the 
transition to parenthood is postponed among young adults who value individual 
autonomy and think that having a child will negatively influence their autonomy. 
The contribution to this volume by Bernhardt and Goldscheider (2006) offers 
another useful illustration that “values matter”. Their article focuses on Sweden, 
which is in the words of its authors “perhaps the furthest among the countries that 
have entered the Second Demographic Transition”. It studies the relationship 
between gender equality, attitudes towards parenthood and timing of first births. 
They show that men who are not holding traditional attitudes towards gender 
equality tend to postpone childbearing as compared to those who do hold 
traditional attitudes. No such effect is found for women. The finding that 
egalitarian attitudes delay the transition to parenthood is therefore consistent with 
the SDT idea that ideational change goes hand in hand with the postponement of 
childbearing. 
Although Testa and Toulemon (2006, this volume) study the role of a more 
proximate determinant of postponement, i.e., fertility intentions, their contribution 
to this issue also documents the important role played by subjective ideas in 
determining fertility decisions. People who intend or expect to have a child within 
five years are much more likely to actually become parents within that time-span 
than people who do not intend or expect to do so. Interestingly, this relationship is 
much stronger among highly educated respondents than among respondents with 
a low level of education, suggesting that the ‘planning capacities’ of the former 
are better than those of the latter. 
 
2.2  The Rise of Women’s Education 
 
Another frequently discussed driving force behind the postponement of fertility is 
the rise in women’s educational attainment. Several mechanisms that cause higher Francesco C. Billari, Aart C. Liefbroer, and Dimiter Philipov 
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educated women to delay motherhood have been put forward. Economic models 
of the timing of first births (e.g., Happel et al. 1984; Gustafsson 2001) predict that 
the higher the woman’s educational level, the later her transition to motherhood. 
The basic premise in these models is that the focus of decision-making in the 
transition to motherhood is on timing, and that opportunity costs of childbearing 
and subsequent long-term financial consequences of motherhood depend on the 
age at motherhood. An additional mechanism that connects educational level and 
fertility (Cigno and Ermisch 1989) in such models is that the higher the level of 
returns to education, the later the transition to motherhood. Empirical findings 
support this economic perspective: Gustafsson et al. (2002), for instance, show 
that in Germany, Great Britain and Sweden higher-educated women become 
mothers at a later age, and that they were the first to start postponing first births.  
The importance of educational enrolment, i.e., of being a student, next to that 
of level of educational attainment, in explaining postponement of childbearing is 
emphasised by a stream of papers that are mostly based on sociological theories 
adopting a life-course perspective and on empirical studies based on event history 
analysis. Blossfeld and Huinink (1991) suggest that “…When a woman is 
attending school, university (…) she is economically highly dependent on her 
parents. Further, there exist normative expectations in society that young people 
who attend school are ‘not at risk’ of entering marriage (and having children)…” 
Educational enrolment is thus hypothesised to have a direct effect on 
postponement in so far as during their period of study people concentrate their 
time and energy on studying and not on starting a family. Using a different 
theoretical framework, Kravdal (1994) finds that in Norway the effects of the 
educational level on the transition to motherhood are small when compared to the 
effects of being enrolled in education or, more specifically, work experience. 
Further theoretical arguments, together with empirical analyses of the impact of 
school enrolment on young adults’ family formation are presented by Thornton 
et  al. (1995), who show that human capital accumulation also influences the 
choice of marital versus non-marital first union, and by Liefbroer and Corijn 
(1999). 
Given the consistency of the various findings in the literature, trends in female 
education can be seen as a major force shaping the postponement of childbearing 
in Europe. In most European countries, educational enrolment is scarcely 
compatible with childbearing, even if the length of education is in part determined 
by the same factors that drive the timing of first birth, and even if the extent of 
incompatibility differs between countries (Billari and Philipov 2004). Moreover, 
trends in educational expansion are correlated with the ideational change that has 
been previously discussed as accompanying the SDT, i.e., both driving forces 
push in the same direction.  Introduction 
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2.3 Uncertainty  During  Young  Adulthood and Policy Changes 
 
The imaginary ‘Hajnal’ line (Hajnal 1965) cuts across Europe, connecting Saint 
Petersburg and Trieste. This line, from a historical perspective, separated a region 
with earlier and more universal marriage and childbearing to the east, and a 
region with later and less universal marriage and childbearing to the west. Also 
during the more recent period between World War  II and the fall of the Iron 
Curtain, this line proved to be an important way of describing differentials in 
Europe (Monnier and Rychtarikova 1992). West of the Hajnal line, fertility at the 
beginning of reproductive ages was low, whereas that was not the case east of the 
line. However, during the 1990s, the postponement of childbearing hit also to the 
east of the Hajnal line, with the partial exception of the Russian Federation (see 
Table 1). 
While insecurity during young adult years has been mentioned as an 
important driver of the postponement of childbearing in southern Europe (see, 
e.g., Kohler et al. 2002), and perceived uncertainty has been shown to influence 
the postponement to parenthood in the Netherlands (Liefbroer 2005), uncertainty 
is supposed to have become of primary importance for the transition economies of 
central and eastern Europe. In most of these transition economies, fertility 
declined very steeply during the 1990s, here immediately following the fall of 
socialist regimes, there with delay of a few years (UNECE 2000; Macura and 
MacDonald 2003; Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). The spread of uncertainty in 
young adulthood, for instance as a result of increasingly difficult access to the 
labour market, in combination with other factors, such as increases in the return to 
education, may explain period trends and international differentials in family 
formation (Bernardi 2000). Under conditions of economic uncertainty, people’s 
income becomes less reliable, and people are likely to postpone childbearing until 
their income becomes more stable and reliable (Blossfeld et al. 2005). In fact, 
Kohler et al. (2002) argue that postponement of the transition to parenthood may 
arise as a rational response to such socio-economic changes. The evidence for this 
in relation to the sharp fertility decline in eastern Europe is, however, still 
ambiguous (Kohler and Kohler 2002). Ranjan (1999) and Bhaumik (2002) find 
uncertainty to be one of the key factors that contributed to the drastic fall in 
fertility in former East Germany during the first half of the 1990s. Philipov et al. 
(2006), in an analysis of fertility intentions in Bulgaria and Hungary, document 
that uncertainty might be reinforced by anomy and disorientation, factors that 
both contribute to the postponement of childbearing. 
An additional factor that might have driven postponement in central and 
eastern Europe is related to policy changes, or to the uncertainty surrounding 
specific policies. Aassve et al. (2006) analyse the impact of the transition from a 
universal to a means-tested type of family allowance in Hungary during the mid-
1990s. The impact of the policy change was to broaden the age gap in the 
transition to motherhood between high and low social strata (as represented by Francesco C. Billari, Aart C. Liefbroer, and Dimiter Philipov 
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educational levels). As soon as the family allowance became universal again, the 
differences returned to their initial level.  
 
 
3  Consequences of the Postponement of Childbearing 
 
The social and economic significance of the postponement of childbearing is 
strongly connected to its consequences at the individual and at the societal level. 
It is hardly surprising, also given the nature of the initial call for papers, that this 
special issue contains a majority of papers dealing with the consequences of the 
postponement of childbearing rather than with the driving factors. All authors 
agree that having children later in life has consequences for individuals, i.e., 
micro-level life-course implications. At the same time, postponement also has 
consequences for the demographic structure of a population, as well as for the 
way we measure fertility at the aggregate level. We now discuss these various sets 
of implications one by one. 
 
3.1 Micro-Level  Implications 
 
One of the key implications of the contemporary postponement of fertility at the 
individual and couple level is its effect on total fertility: a later start, ceteris 
paribus, might result in having fewer children. While, in a cross-section of 
countries, often no specific macro-level relationship between mean age at first 
birth and the period total fertility rate is observed (see, e.g., Dalla Zuanna 2001), 
the literature has repeatedly documented the existence of a postponement effect on 
fertility at the individual level. Ultimately, voluntary postponement may lead to 
involuntary childlessness. Kohler and Ortega (2002) introduced in this setting the 
aggregate-level notion of fertility ageing effect, defined as the reduction in higher-
order births (or parity progression ratios) caused by a postponement of fertility at 
first (or second) births, to study the interaction between the timing and quantum 
of fertility (see below). 
The micro-level postponement effect is, however, of different magnitude in 
different settings: in Kohler et al. (2002) the postponement effect is an important 
mechanism that contributes to decreasing the quantum of fertility in countries 
with lowest-low fertility levels. More specifically, postponing first births has a 
particularly important impact on quantum fertility in those societies where 
institutional arrangements such as labour market regulations, childcare system 
and gender relationships make it more problematic for women to combine family 
life and occupational careers. Southern European countries, for instance, show a 
higher postponement effect than northern European countries such as Sweden. An 
empirical example of the individual-level postponement effect is given in 
Figure  1, from Billari and Borgoni (2005), where the (predicted) completed 




























Source: Billari and Borgoni (2005) 
 
The postponement of births matters for its relationships with opportunity 
costs; however it has implications on biological clocks and other changes that are 
influenced by age. Fecundability has been shown to decline with age, both for 
men and for women (i.e., Larsen and Vaupel 1993; Dunson et al. 2002). Leridon 
(2004) estimates that in non-contracepting populations the mean age at the onset 
of women’s sterility is 44.7 years. The potential inability to realise one’s own 
childbearing plans as a consequence of fertility postponement is investigated from 
a behavioural perspective by Rizzi and Rosina (2006, this volume). Age-specific 
fecundability, i.e., the probability of conception in a given period for sexually 
active couples not using contraception, is known to decline by age. Using a 
unique and purposely collected data set, the “Multinational Study on Daily 
Fecundability” (Colombo and Masarotto 2000), Rizzi and Rosina show that the 
frequency of sexual intercourse declines with age, and that the desire to have a 
child seems to compensate only partially for the effect of the decrease in coital 
frequency. The micro-level effect of the postponement of childbearing on total 
fertility is therefore not only due to the physiological decline of fecundability with 
age, but also to the proximate behavioural determinant, i.e., sexual behaviour. 
A second set of micro-level consequences of postponement relates to 
pregnancy and birth outcomes. Leridon (2005), for instance, documents the 
impact of age on the ability to carry a pregnancy to term after successful 
conception: his estimates of the probability of a miscarriage reach 20% at age 37, 
30% at age 44, and 40% at age 48. Matsuo (2006, this volume) focuses on the 
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from the analysis of two longitudinal datasets from Belgium confirm former 
analyses and show that the higher the maternal age, the higher the risk of adverse 
health outcomes for the child (i.e., low birth weight and slower weight gain after 
birth). Such adverse health outcomes are particularly likely if mothers get 
children beyond age 40. 
While not explicitly addressed in this volume, it is important to stress that 
there exists a literature on potentially positive individual-level consequences of 
the postponement of childbearing. The main, and fiercely debated, issue is about 
the relationship between age at birth, for a given parity, and longevity. For 
instance, Müller et al. (2002) claim that “late children enhance female longevity”, 
reporting from an analysis of historical data that a mother’s life expectation 
increases when she gives birth later. Yi and Vaupel (2004) document that 
childbearing after age 35 or 40 is positively associated with survival among 
Chinese women and men. However, a later age at (last) birth might be an 
indicator of later age at sterility (McArdle et al. 2006). Mueller (2004), on the 
contrary, in an analysis of a dataset on European royalty finds that later 
reproduction did not extend the life span. Although inconclusive, this literature 
raises the awareness that researchers should be careful in suggesting that the 
micro-level consequences of postponement are necessarily bad. What is more 
needed instead is a careful consideration of the consequences of postponement for 
all relevant life domains and for all people (parents and children) involved. 
 
3.2  Fertility Measurement and Macro-Level Implications 
 
According to Morgan and Taylor (2006, p. 378), “a key question is whether 
aggregate fertility change (in a given period) reflects fertility postponement 
(timing) or a change in the number of births women will have (quantum)”. 
Measuring the postponement of fertility is crucial for studying contemporary 
fertility because of its analytical (and, potentially, policy) consequences. In the 
presence of a widespread postponement of births, traditional period fertility 
measures have to be interpreted with great care.  
Period total fertility rates, which have been used to define the threshold of 
lowest-low fertility, are rightly criticised in the literature for being subject to 
various types of distortion. This problem was long debated in the fertility 
literature, but has been revived in recent years by the contribution of Bongaarts 
and Feeney (1998). Different proposals have been made over the last few years 
for how to compute a distortion-free measure of period fertility, which can give a 
better interpretation of behavioural choices (see the review in Ortega and Kohler 
2002). Bongaarts and Feeney (2006, this volume) generalise their original 1998 
framework for the analysis of tempo and quantum of childbearing to all life 
course events. They develop and apply methods to remove tempo distortions to 
various measures, including those derived from life tables.  Introduction 
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The discussion on the measurement of fertility has also stimulated reflection 
on the potential limits to postponement. Sobotka (2004b, p. 212), for instance, 
describes lowest-low fertility in Europe as a “result of increasing age at 
motherhood and, therefore, a temporary phenomenon that will fade once the 
postponement of childbearing stops”. While individual-level limits to 
postponement have to be related to the possibility to bear children at advanced 
ages (Billari et al. 2006), and are therefore connected to the micro-level 
consequences of postponement discussed in Section 3.1, aggregate-level limits to 
postponement have so far not been explicitly addressed in the literature. Goldstein 
(2006, this volume) presents the results of a simulation study based on 
transformations of actual fertility schedules by age at first birth for Danish women 
born 1963. Under a set of what seem to be realistic hypotheses, Goldstein finds 
that a mean age at first birth of about 33 years is plausible, implying that 
postponement can continue in the near future without radical changes in 
individual-level limits. 
Although period measures of fertility have been criticised, we cannot do without 
them if we want to study what is currently happening and grasp changes in trends 
(Ní Bhrolchain 1992). Calot (2001), for instance, advocates the use of the period 
total fertility rate to measure the ratio of the size of the newborn generation to the 
generation of mothers. A synthetic indicator of this type reflects the joint effect of 
the number of births, population age structure, population ageing, and cohort 
replacement, and thus brings forward a central role for period fertility. At the 
same time, one has to reflect upon the long-term consequences of postponement 
for future fertility levels. Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa (2006, this volume) deal with a 
potential mechanism that would induce a continued decline in the number of 
births, i.e., a low fertility trap. The mechanism is built around three components. 
First, because of the so-called negative momentum of population growth, the 
decrease in the number of births would continue at least for a period even in the 
presence of an increase in period fertility (see also Lutz et al. 2003). Second, 
personal ideal family sizes might decline if they are influenced by current fertility 
level. Third, a decline in relative income (Easterlin 1980) might contribute further 
to depress fertility. In conjunction, all these mechanisms could induce a situation 
in which a future increase of fertility level would become highly unlikely. 
Postponement might have a self-reinforcing dynamics that transcends the reasons 
that triggered it. This mirrors an argument, developed by Kohler et al. (2002), that 
what we are observing is actually a postponement transition which is likely to be 
irreversible. Evidence for this irreversibility is given in analogy to what has been 
shown for the fertility decline during the demographic transition, with the pace of 
postponement of first birth developing in a similar manner in different countries 
even if the postponement starts in different years. 
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4  Policy Implications 
 
The theoretical model presented in this volume by Lutz, Skirbekk and Testa 
(2006) brings us the potential policy implications of the postponement of 
childbearing. At the macro level, postponement matters insofar as it influences 
completed fertility and the size of birth cohorts. So far we have seen that the 
general evidence points to a significant causal role of the postponement of 
childbearing in completed fertility derived from the micro level. The Green Paper 
“Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between generations” issued 
in 2005 by the European Commission indeed recognises the role of the 
postponement of childbearing in shaping completed fertility, one of the basic 
trends that are targeted by European policy-makers: “The baby-boomer 
generation has had fewer children than previous generations, as a result of many 
factors: difficulties in finding a job, the lack and cost of housing, the older age of 
parents at the birth of their first child, different study, working life and family life 
choices” (Commission of the European Communities 2005, p. 3).  
The postponement of childbearing has also specific implications on 
population ageing. Lutz, O’Neill and Scherbov (2003, p. 1992), for instance, 
compute that “[t]wenty years of continued increases in the mean age of 
childbearing imply an additional decline in the support ratio of about 0.5 workers 
per elderly person by 2065, the year when the difference is most pronounced”. 
For these reasons, some scholars have suggested that policies explicitly take the 
timing of births as a target, promoting policies that allow counterbalancing, if not 
reversing, the postponement of childbearing. These ideas, labelled tempo policies, 
have been described by Lutz and Skirbekk (2005) as a means to avoid a low-
fertility trap. An exemplary tempo policy is one that shortens the period spent in 
education: taking for granted the results mentioned in Section 2.2 on the 
importance of having completed education as a prerequisite for family formation, 
shortening educational timetables might allow for earlier family formation. An 
alternative, or possibly complementary approach, would call for policies that 
allow an easier combination of education and family formation (Billari and 
Philipov 2004). 
These examples make it clear that whether fertility-related policies are 
contemplated or not depends crucially on the assessment of the consequences of 
these trends. This is an important reason for research that focuses on the 
individual and societal consequences of postponement. At the same time, policies 
will only be effective if the causes of these trends are well understood and if 
policies can either change people’s preferences regarding the timing of 
parenthood or the opportunity structure that hampers the realisation of people’s 
preferences. Therefore, knowledge on the relative weight of each driving force 
does not only carry importance for researchers who aim at evaluating the main 
causes behind postponement, but may also lead to different policy implications 
(Hantrais et al. 2006).  Introduction 
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The aim and content of policies that might affect the timing (and quantum) of 
childbearing is discussed in two articles in this issue. Van de Kaa (2006, this 
volume) discusses why governments are ’prudent’ in considering pro-natal 
policies. His reasoning on the centrality and effectiveness of policies aimed at 
supporting birth rates is based on a series of related arguments, inter alia that (a) 
governments usually give first priority to structural reforms, (b) the scientific 
evidence on the effectiveness of pronatalist policies on fertility is weak, (c) 
population policies enjoy a bad reputation because of their misuse by 
undemocratic regimes in the past, and (d) future social change might lead to a 
reversal in fertility. However, McDonald (2006, this volume) states that it is too 
risky “to wait for a homeostatic correction to low fertility” and that the 
introduction by governments of relevant policies to increase births is inescapable. 
He addresses systematically a series of principles that should guide policies aimed 
at supporting the birth rate. He is, however, rather sceptical about policies 
explicitly targeting the timing of births, and in particular does not support a 
possible age-selectivity of monetary benefits connected to childbearing. 
 
 
5  On Future Research on the Postponement of 
Childbearing 
 
What this introduction, and in particular the various contributions to this volume, 
will make clear, is that the postponement of childbearing involves a 
heterogeneous but interconnected and highly relevant set of topics on which 
further research is greatly needed.  
For what concerns the driving forces of postponement, future research will 
have to try to weight the relative importance of the different factors that 
contribute to childbearing postponement. New efforts in the collection of data that 
allow a potentially multidisciplinary approach to fertility decision-making are in 
place, and we expect them to be fruitful in future research. In particular, the 
Generations and Gender Survey, which is part of a broader Generations and 
Gender Program, should allow the evaluation of the weight of different factors in 
a diverse set of contexts (see Vikat et al. 2006). Special attention, in this regard, 
should be given to research that tries to establish whether effects are causal or 
spurious. This is particularly true when the impact of policy changes on the 
postponement of childbearing is being evaluated. Still within the domain of 
driving forces, and given the high levels of diversity both across and within 
societies, we expect future research to give particular attention to micro-macro 
interaction, i.e., to the way context shapes the relationships between specific 
drivers and the decision to postpone childbearing (Lesthaeghe 1998). 
Studies on the micro- and macro-consequences of the postponement of 
childbearing will be of great interest as well, as witnessed also by the 
concentration of papers in this volume in this area of research. The implications Francesco C. Billari, Aart C. Liefbroer, and Dimiter Philipov 
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of postponing fertility to extremely advanced ages (e.g., above 40 or 45 years for 
women) is vastly understudied, and further investigation could be expected on 
this issue. In the area of formal demography and the consequences of childbearing 
postponement on measurement, more will probably have to be done in connecting 
micro-level decision-making models and macro-level measurement models. 
In conclusion, we feel that this issue of the Vienna Yearbook contains a 
diverse and stimulating set of articles. Future research on postponement of 
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